Campbell, Tim , Kaczmarek, Patrick | 2024
Working Paper 2024:5
Part of Preprint Studies in the Ethics of Coordination and Climate Change
Creating a new person produces more CO2 emissions than many other lifestyle choices, such as driving a gas-powered car, eating meat, and flying. According to Climate Anti-Natalism, for this reason, in many instances, it is wrong to create a new person, even if that person would have a good life. Arguments for Climate Anti-Natalism point to the harm that CO2 emissions cause, but they do not recognize any moral reason to create people with good lives. We identify a harm-avoidance principle underlying arguments for Climate Anti-Natalism. We then show that any moral theory that accommodates this harm-avoidance principle has implausible implications. Such a theory either permits agents to create people with bad lives rather than with good lives, requires agents to harm people just to avoid imposing less harm on those same people, or permits agents to impose any amount of uncompensated harm. A reasonable response to this problem is to reject the harm-avoidance principle, thus undermining the case for Climate Anti-Natalism.
