Budolfson, Mark | 2024
Arbetsrapport 2024:3
Del av Studies in the Ethics of Coordination and Climate Change
In a prisoner’s dilemma, if everyone follows the strategy of self-interest, then everyone is certain to be worse off from the perspective of self-interest than if everyone had not followed self-interest instead. This shows that self-interest is sometimes directly collectively self-defeating, because it shows that sometimes everyone has all the relevant information, correctly follows self-interest, but thereby ends up worse off from the perspective of self-interest than they would have been if they had all followed some other antecedently identifiable strategy instead. In Reasons and Persons and On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that it is a constraint on any plausible moral theory that morality must never be directly collectively self-defeating, and he claims that the most plausible versions of consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantian ethics all imply that morality is never directly collectively self-defeating. Some theorists not only agree with Parfit that morality can never be directly collectively self-defeating, but also believe that rationality and other forms of normativity can never have that property either. I argue against these theorists, with examples that show that morality and all other interesting forms of normativity are sometimes directly collectively self-defeating.
