deserve
Do Offenders Deserve Proportionate Punishments?
Criminal Law & Philosophy Abstract The aim of the paper is to investigate how retributivists should respond to the apparent tension between moral desert and proportionality in punishment. I argue th
Retributivism and Public Opinion: On the Context Sensitivity of Desert
Criminal Law and Philosophy, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 125-142. Abstract Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, h
Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox
Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

The (New) Case for Wage-Earner Funds
Research seminar with Markus Furendal, Post-Doc in Political Science, Stockholm University, and Martin O'Neill, Professor of Philosophy at University of York. Abstract In our presentation we make the
Research seminar with Markus Furendal & Martin O'Neill
Place: At the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, or online. REGISTER HEREResearch seminar with Markus Furendal, Post-Doc in Political Science, Stockholm University, and Martin
Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics
Philosophy Compass 13 (6), 2018. DOI:10.1111/phc3.12493. Abstract The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of cr

Sovereignty and sustainability - friends or foes? Interview with Steven Vanderheiden
To limit the global warming to a maximum of two degrees above pre-industrial levels, much of the coal and oil reserves on earth must stay in the ground. This requires international agreements to limit
Long-run income and wealth inequality, and the potential impact on inheritance flows
Jesper Roine, Associate Professor at Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics I will present what we know about long run income and wealth distribution across countries and also connect these findin
Identification of influential spreaders in complex networks
2010. Nature Physics 6:888-893. AbstractNetworks portray a multitude of interactions through which people meet, ideas are spread, and infectious diseases propagate within a society. Identifying the most
Should Extinction Be Forever?
Should Extinction Be Forever?, Philosophy and Technology, First online: 17 october 2015 This article will explore a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species. Although the re-cr, (6128), 32–33, ). This article will provide an argument in favour of re-creation based on normative considerations. The environmentalist community generally accepts that it is wrong to exterminate species, for reasons beyond any instrumental value these species may have. It is often also claimed that humanity has a collective responsibility to either preserve or at least to not exterminate species. These two beliefs are here assumed to be correct. The argument presented here departs from and places these two ideas in a deontological framework, from which it is argued that when humanity causes the extinction of a species, this is a moral transgression, entailing a residual obligation. Such an obligation implies a positive duty to mitigate any harm caused by our moral failure. In light of recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, it will be argued that humanity has a prima facie obligation to re-create species whose extinction mankind may have caused, also known as de-extinction.