At last Friday’s research seminarKatrin Ausprung from the Department of History and Sociology at Konstanz University in Germany came to talk to us about her reserach on discrimination in housing marke

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22, 873–891. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9908-4 Abstract Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the h

The project aims to evaluate the ethical consequences, on an individual and collective level, of implicit bias that causes ethnic discrimination.

Can ethnic implicit bias affect how public officials at social security offices assess applications for income support and if so, can these attitudes be changed or controlled across time?

Garrett Cullity: How Discriminatory Attitudes Can Make Actions Wrong

Research seminar with Garrett Cullity, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University, known for his research on moral philosophy. Abstract In general, otherwise permissible actions do

Garrett Cullity: How Discriminatory Attitudes Can Make Actions Wrong

Research seminar with Garrett Cullity, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University, known for his research on moral philosophy. Abstract In general, otherwise permissible actions do

Theoria, Early View, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12227  Abstract Recent social‐psychological research suggests that a considerable amount of, for example, racial and gendered discrimination may

In Bognar, G & A. Gosseries (red.) Ageing without Ageism? Conceptual Puzzles and Policy Proposals. Oxford Academic. Abstract This chapter examines the moral status of age discrimination by bringing t

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimina­tion (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discri­mination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future genera­tions is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.

What is it that makes discrimination wrong? We examine the concept of harm and its philosophical relevance, as well as the role it plays in discrimination.