expenses
Benefiting at the Expense of Climate Change
In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract ‘For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer thro
The Relationship Between Demographic Change and Economic Growth in the EU
Vienna Institute of Demography and Institute for Futures Studies, 2007: Research Report No. 32 The future economic growth in the EU will determine the opportunities of implementing age-related expenses
AI in healthcare
Venue: The Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm This workshop is open to invitees only. For more information please contact the organizers. The imperative to adopt Artificial Intelligence (AI) has be
Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6
Julia Mosquera & Olle Torpman (eds) Working paper series 2024:10–17 10: Productive Justice in the 'Post-Work Future' Caleb Althorpe & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns 11: Degrees of Incommensurability and
Declining birth rates - should we worry?
Are declining birth rates one of the biggest threats to humanity? Among others, Elon Musk and Donald Trump's vice-presidential candidate JD Vance seem to think so. But Karim Jebari disagrees. In the p, he explains why we don't need to worry so much.
Completed: Algorithms in public decision-making. Social construction in change
How can we ensure the transparency required in a democracy and still make us of new AI technology in the public sector?
Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox
Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.
