David Miller, Professor of Political Theory, FBA, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College Abstract States often justify their restrictive immigration policies by appealing to their right of self-determ

Professor Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Department of Political Science, Århus University.Abstract Many think affirmative action is (un)justified. But does it really make sense to have views about affirmat

In The Oxford Handbook of Intergenerational Ethics, Stephen M. Gardiner (ed.), s. C36.S1 - C36.N20. Abstract In constructivist contractualist theories, such as Rawls’, principles of justice should mirror

Stefan Arora-Jonsson, Professor at the Department of Business Studies, Uppsala universitet ABSTRACTCompetition is a ubiquitous feature of modern society, perhaps more so now than ever before. While com

European Journal of Political Theory, DOI: 10.1177/1474885117738116 Abstract How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, pbecome a powerful weapon to criticize work conditionality as unfair and perfectionistic (or illiberal), and to motivate political struggles for the emancipation of the precariat. However, similar views are also expressed in many other justifications of basic income that stress the strategic importance of exit-based empowerment. This article argues that the reliance of these theories on concepts and assumptions of libertarianism makesthem ill-equipped to justify core requirements of social empowerment, and to identify the forms of agency needed to sustainably advance the radical objectives they favour. The implication of this is not to reject the link between social justice and unconditional resource endowments but to dissociate the justification and design of such measures from libertarian ways of thinking.

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30(1), 5–22. Abstract It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This pa

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, pp. 1-13, DOI 10.1007/s10677-017-9824-z. Abstract The question raised in this paper is whether legal rights to vote are also moral rights to vote. The challenge to the

Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 86, pp. 108-111.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.05.041 Abstract Extending previous research, we examined whether the relation between social dominance orientat

Philosophical Studies, June 2012, Volume 159, Issue 2,  pp 205–218. Online first. doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9698-1 Abstract When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people ha

Frontiers in Psychology AbstractPeople often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It isunfairif homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals matraditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.