orgad
Rainer Bauböck: Globalization, new technologies and the future of democratic citizenship
Professor of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute. ABSTRACT Liberal democratic citizenship has been shaped by the legacies of Athens (democracy) and Rome (legal rights) but operate between individuals and states. In a Westphalian world, citizenship has both instrumental and identity value. Enhanced opportunities and interests in mobility rights strengthen instrumental interests in multiple citizenship among immigrants, among populations in less developed countries, and among wealthy elites. The latter two trends potentially undermine a genuine link norm and, if they prevail, might replace the Westphalian allocation of citizenship with a global market. New digital technologies create a second challenge to Westphalian citizenship. As has argued, digital identities could provide a global legal persona for all human beings independently of their nationality, and blockchain technologies could enable the formation of non-territorial political communities providing governance services to their members independently of states. Both the instrumental uses of citizenship for geographic mobility and technologies that create substitutes for territorial citizenship are not merely relevant as current trends. They are also advocated and defended normatively as responses to the global injustice of the birthright lottery. I will challenge this idea and argue that liberal democracies should not be conceived as voluntary associations whose membership is freely chosen, but as communities of destiny among people who have been thrown together by history and their circumstances of life. How these foundations of democratic community can be maintained in the context of rising mobility and the digital revolution remains an open question.
The ethics of age limits
This informal workshop focuses on four papers dealing with a variety of ethical questions associated with the use of age limits, especially in health care. Time: Wednesday, November 23, 14:00 - 18:00Plac The Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS), Holländardgatan 13, Stockholm According to Jeff McMahan, we ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A. Call this claim . I argue that if we accept , then we must reject at least one of three other claims:
