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Quasi-realism and normative certitude
in: Synthese 2020 Abstract Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, su
Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism
in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi
The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Venue:The Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, and online This event is open to the public.Conference poster. This conference will depart from and engage with the recent and critby Professor David Chalmers.
Politics of AI & Health: From Snake Oil to Social Good
The potential for AI to improve health and healthcare systems is considerable. However, there is a pressing need to critically engage with the politics of AI and health, and this project will do so from an interdisciplinary perspective.
Three Mistakes in the Moral Reasoning About the Covid-19 Pandemic
Institute for Futures Studies Working Paper Series 2020:12 Abstract The response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the public discourse about the pandemic, can be used to illustrate three common mistakes in
Equality and equity in Swedish education: policy, practice and historical perspectives
Björn Åstrand, Universitetslektor vid Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier vid Umeå universitet. Equality and equity in education is since long a key policy priority internationally as well as in
Moral Disagreement
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) ABSTRACT Appeals to moral disagreement have figured in philosophical discussions since antiquity, especially regarding questions about the nat, 14). It is often dubious to characterize the thoughts of ancient philosophers by using distinctions and terminologies that have emerged much later. Still, it is tempting to take Sextus to offer an argument against the metaethical position known as “moral realism” and its central thesis that there are moral truths which are objective in the sense that they are independent of human practices and thinking.
A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism
Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts
Three Mistakes in the Moral Reasoning About the Covid-19 Pandemic
Orri Stefánsson, philosopher at the Institute for Futures Studies and decision theorist, dissects the moral reasoning about the Covid-19 pandemic. (This text is part of the Institute for Futures Studie)
Denial versus reality of climate change
In: D. DellaSala, & M. Goldstein (Eds). Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene. Elsevier. Sammanfattning Despite the extensive supportive evidence for climate change, there still exists doubt and denial a
