In: G. Sosa-Nunez, & E. Atkins (Eds). E-IR Edited Collections: Environment, climate change and international relations. E-International Relations Publishing. Read more about Edited Collection – Envi

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 20, Issue 5,  pp 957–968, doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9842-x. Abstract Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one

Reducing populations' vulnerabilities to mis-disinformation related to scientific content

The purpose of this project is to develop evidence-based strategies to address populations’ vulnerabilities to scientific mis-disinformation.

In six months libraries and schools will once again be transformed into voting stations and the Swedish people will vote for the Sweden they want for the next four years. A question that has been on p

The workshop will focus on how one can account for value incommensurability, its implications for ethical theory and decision theory.

The workshop will focus on how one can account for value incommensurability, its implications for ethical theory and decision theory.

PLOS Computational Biology Abstract Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to huma

The Monist, Volume 102, Issue 1, pages: 42-65. doi.org/10.1093/monist/ony021 Abstract It is often claimed that reducing population size would be advantageous for climate change mitigation, on the ground

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

The future of disabilities: The ethics and politics of disability and technology

This project will investigate how theories on equality and justice are affected by the fact that many disabilities are becoming a matter of choice as a consequence of the use of new technologies.