Foresight, doi.org/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0042  Abstract PurposeThe claim that super intelligent machines constitute a major existential risk was recently defended in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence and

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This

Virginie Pérotin, Professor of Economics at Leeds University Business School ABSTRACTFirms run by their employees are often thought to be more productive than other firms because of the effects of work

Mind Abstract Candice Delmas’ A Duty to Resist arrives, fittingly, in a world of increasing authoritarianism, and the caged children and burning forests left in its wake. Widely diagnosed as a failure t

Ethics, Politics & Society. A Journal in Moral and Political Philosophy, N. 1, 2018, pp.89-122. Abstract Who should have a right to take part in which decisions in democratic decision making? This ““a people”, who takes decision in a democratic fashion. However, that a decision is made with a democratic decision method by a certain group of people doesn’t suffice for making the decision democratic or satisfactory from a democratic perspective. The group also has to be the right one. But what makes a group the right one? The criteria by which to identify the members of the people entitled to participate in collective decisions have been surprisingly difficult to pin down. In this paper, I shall revisit some of the problems discussed in my 2005 paper in light of some recent criticism and discussion of my position in the literature, and address a number of new issues.

In N. Marschner, C. Richter, J. Patz, & A. Salheiser (Eds.), Contested climate justice – Challenged democracy: International perspectives (pp. 59-71). Campus Verlag GmbH Abstract Earth is on a catastryet, there is little sign of halting the rise of global greenhouse gas emissions orstopping the extraction of fossil fuels. Against this background, in this articlewe re-engage with a recently proposed typology supposed to cover three modesthrough which effective climate action has been obstructed. These are, first,primary obstruction, that is, the spread of disinformation and/or denying the veryexistence of anthropogenic climate change. Second, secondary obstruction concernsmore or less deliberate obstruction via opposition to climate action and policiesvia, for example, reference to “the threat of deindustrialisation”. Finally, tertiaryobstruction denotes modes of living which, while not necessarily obstructingeffective climate change intentionally, concerns “living in denial”. Drawing onrecent research and examples, we revisit this typology.

Venue: Institute for Futures Studies,Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm or online  Research seminar with Anandi Hattiangadi, professor of philosophy at Stockholm University and a researcher at the Institute

Anandi Hattiangadi: Artificial General Intelligence - A Manifesto

The race is on to produce artificial general intelligence (AGI)—machines that are at least as intelligent as humans—despite widespread concern that an AGI would pose an existential threat to humankind

In: Delinquency and Drift Revisited: The Criminology of David Matza and Beyond. Advances in Criminological Theory Vol. 21, eds. Thomas G. Blomberg, Frank T. Cullen, Cheryl Johnson & Christoffer Ca