virtues
False Choices: A Response to Michael Ignatieff's The Ordinary Virtues
King's Law Journal 30, 356-362 Abstract Part political journalism, travel memoir, political theory, sociology, anthropology, and moral psychology, Michael Ignatieff’s The Ordinary Virtues defies easy de
Value and Time
in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Eds. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. This chapter discusses time and value. The two main questions are: What is the time of value? and Wha

Bayesian and non-Bayesian epistemic attitudes and existential risk
In this talk Olle Häggström will sketch and contrast two different epistemic attitudes that roughly correspond to Bayesianism and Popperian falsificationism. He will argue that they both have virtues
Simone Abram: Caring and sharing: Democratic imaginaries in question
Dr Simone Abram, Department of Anthropology, Durham University ABSTRACT Within the broad term 'democratic state' there is a messy set of imagined virtues, vices and possibilities. In this paper, I consi
POSTPONED! - New date November 25 - Olle Häggström: Bayesian and non-Bayesian epistemic attitudes (webinar)
THIS SEMINAR IS POSTPONED - New date November 25 Olle Häggströmis professor of mathematical statistics at Chalmers University of Technology, researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies and a board
Olle Häggström: Bayesian and non-Bayesian epistemic attitudes, with applications to the atomic bomb, artificial intelligence, covid-19 and existential risk (webinarium)
Olle Häggströmis professor of mathematical statistics at Chalmers University of Technology, researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies and a board member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences
The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Venue:The Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, and online This event is open to the public.Conference poster. This conference will depart from and engage with the recent and critby Professor David Chalmers.
Consequentialism and Robust Goods
Utilitas, 1–9, doi:10.1017/S0953820819000116 Abstract In this article, I critique the moral theory developed in Philip Pettit’s The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respecvirtue and respect. I argue that Robust-Goods Consequentialism fails because it implies very implausible value judgements.

Anandi Hattiangadi: A Skeptic's Guide to Virtual Worlds - A response to David Chalmers
Are virtual worlds "real"? Or are they merely "virtual"? In a recent book by David Chalmers, "Reality + - Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy", he argues that if we in fact were already livi
Climate Change, Historical Emissions, and Unjust Benefits: A Comment on Axel Gosseries’ Account of Climate Justice
Journal of Practical Ethics Abstract One of the claims Axel Gosseries makes in What is Intergenerational Justice? is that greenhouse gas emissions produced before 1990 are morally unimportant for presen