Research seminar with Garrett Cullity, professor of philosophy at the Australian National University, known for his research on moral philosophy. Abstract In general, otherwise permissible actions do not become wrong when agents act on bad attitudes. But cases of discrimination can be exceptions to this generalization. It could “be morally permissible for someone to rent her house to any one of several prospective tenants but not morally permissible to refuse to rent it to one of those people because of his race” (Scanlon 2008: 71). These two claims are plausible and widely accepted—see the many references in Sverdlik (1996: 327-331). But these two claims call out for explanation. Why is it that in some cases of discrimination, the agent’s bad attitude makes an otherwise permissible action wrong? And why are such cases exceptional? Why don’t otherwise permissible actions generally become impermissible when agents act on bad attitudes?
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