Datum: 18 september 2024
Tid: 10:00-11:45
Venue: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm
Research seminar with Lukas Meyer, professor of philosophy at the University of Graz.
Abstract
This paper discusses how legitimate expectations should be treated during transitional processes. It examines whether the state is permitted to frustrate those expectations, that, although legitimate at time T1, are at time T2 no longer legitimate due to changed circumstances. Further, it discusses the conditions under which those who may see their expectations frustrated during transitional processes should receive measures of compensation. First, we argue that legitimate expectations reflect a legitimate interest in receiving the benefits of the basic structure of society. Then, we distinguish between rights-protected legitimate expectations and those that do not have such protection. We argue that legitimate expectations protected by rights can be justifiably frustrated only if doing so is necessary to arrive at a just society. Those legitimate expectations that merely reflect a legitimate interest in the benefits of the basic structure cannot only be justifiably frustrated if this is necessary to arrive at a just society. Their frustration can also be justified if the expectation holder has an adequate range of options of roughly equal quality. Finally, we argue that when someone is committed to a certain life plan based on an expectation that was legitimate at T1 but, because of changes in circumstances, is no longer legitimate at T2, the value of personal autonomy gives rise to a “meta-expectation” that a certain amount of time will be allowed for people to adapt their life plan to new circumstances. We also contend that the frustration of expectations that are no longer legitimate during transitions may still require compensation after the change in circumstances if the agent responsible for its creation frustrates it.
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