Blomberg, Olle, Petersson, Björn | 2024
Arbetsrapport 2024:2
Del av Studies in the Ethics of Coordination and Climate Change
A violation of a collective moral obligation can take place without each member violating an individual obligation. That may seem problematic. A violation of a moral obligation typically justifies moral blame. If we blame a group, individual members will register the blame. According to an influential view from John Stuart Mill and others, the primary function of moral blame is to evoke feelings of guilt, and guilt feelings, as Mill says, are unpleasant and can be considered as a basic form of punishment. Also, feeling guilty involves acknowledging fault. Then, in line with the Millean view, the individual member may be punished for a violation she did not commit, and be required to take on responsibility for a fault that was not hers, which appears unfair as well as incoherent. Given the Millean view of moral blame, it seems then that we should give up the idea that groups can have irreducibly collective obligations. We confront this objection by explaining how genuine feelings of guilt which are unpleasant and involve acknowledging fault can be the appropriate response to moral blame towards one’s group, even for an individually innocent group member. We thereby reconcile the Millean view of moral blame with the possibility of irreducibly collective moral obligations. Our explanation is based on the idea that an individual can identify with her group in a strong sense, and harbour guilt feelings from different perspectives.
