Torpman, Olle | 2024
Arbetsrapport 2024:9
Del av Studies in the Ethics of Coordination and Climate Change
What moral reasons to act could an individual have if her action would not make any difference? In this paper, I argue that there are responsibility-based reasons for individuals to act, and that these can help explain why an individual sometimes should act in so-called collective impact cases even if she cannot make a difference with respect to the outcome in those cases. I distinguish between retrospective and prospective kinds of responsibility, and argue that (i) an individual has prospective responsibility-based reasons to act in a specific way in collective impact cases, if she will thereby avoid contributing causally to harm, or contribute causally to good when that is desirable; and (ii) an individual has retrospective responsibility-based reason to act in a specific way in collective impact cases, if she would otherwise be blameworthy for making a (causal or constitutive) contribution to harmful outcomes in such cases.
